The End of the New Jew and the Rebirth of the Old

The against-the-odds success story of the state of Israel, preparing to celebrate its 75th birthday next year, is one even its fiercest critics cannot but acknowledge. Considered a poor, inflation-ridden economic basket case within living memory, it has now become one of the most robust economies in the world, notably joining the list of twenty countries with the highest GDP per capita in 2020 (and in the midst of a global economic crisis at that). This economic prosperity has been successfully leveraged to end its regional isolation, a new free-trade deal with the UAE being only the latest on the list of once-inconceivable diplomatic triumphs. Where good relations are still not possible, Israel’s impeccably equipped and highly sophisticated army is the terror of the Middle East. And, of course, its Jewish population continues to grow by leaps and bounds, buoyed both by uniquely high fertility rates (for a Western country) and new immigrants driven not just by ideology, but, increasingly, by the belief that Israel is a Jew’s best option for a prosperous and happy life.

The Zionist ascendancy is all the more remarkable because a mere twenty years ago many observers worried that the project was on the brink of collapse. Critics portrayed an Israeli elite that had given up on Zionist ideals, resigned itself to an Arab demographic tsunami, and planned to give up the Jewish heartlands of the West Bank and perhaps even the old city of Jerusalem—while at the same time turning the rump entity left behind into a “state of all its citizens” shorn of any national basis.

Pessimistic predictions of post-Zionist dissolution, though, proved false, and Israel’s resurgence has been accompanied by the decline, decline, and further decline of the post-nationalist Israeli left and a dramatic re-commitment to the principles and practice of nationalism. The dominance of the Israeli right today is perhaps even more far-reaching than that of the Labor Zionist Mapai party during the 1950s and 60s: all Israeli political movements with any hope of forming a government are proudly members of the “national camp” (or at least like to assert that they are). Indeed, around the world, aspiring nationalists now look to Israel’s leaders as an example of what can be achieved in a global climate that is largely hostile to their aspirations.