What Can Be Done Politically to Weaken Hamas

America’s interests in Gaza are threefold: to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Palestinians living there, to strengthen Israel’s security, and to see an end to the control of the Gaza Strip by a terrorist group increasingly allied with Iran. Hamas stands in the way of all three, and the end of Hamas control of Gaza should underpin America’s strategy in the region over the coming years. How can this be won?

Some relevant history offers the context for my argument. In 2003 Ariel Sharon announced his decision to remove Israeli settlements from Gaza, and later decided to remove Israel’s military presence as well. Sharon had come to expect nothing from peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and concluded that it was time for Israel to start setting its final borders. Those final borders, he said in December 2003, would not include Gaza with its then population of 1.5 million Arabs and 7,500 Jews—Jews who needed constant, costly, and difficult protection from the IDF.

Was there ever a chance that peace and democracy would prevail in Gaza? By the time Sharon moved settlers out in 2005, Arafat was dead and there was some thought that the Palestinian Authority (PA) could rule there as it did in the West Bank—not a model democracy, but after Arafat’s death a somewhat stable place whose security forces worked closely with the United States and with Israel against terrorism. Sharon did not help the PA take over Gaza, arguing (to the Bush administration, in which I served) that the only way he could maintain political support from a divided Israel for withdrawing from Gaza was by saying it was done purely for Israeli interests and utterly without cooperating with the Palestinians. Within days, all the Israeli settlements—including valuable and productive greenhouses—had been destroyed by rioters and marauders. Within two years, Hamas had seized power, after killing, imprisoning, or driving out PA security forces.