It’s the Birthrates, Stupid!

Rafi DeMogge has performed a real service by pointing out that Israel’s fertility rates are more important to its demographic future than either immigration or emigration at their current levels. Obviously, immigration can be a gamechanger; it was during the state’s early years and again with the mass post-Soviet aliyah of the 1990s. (Theoretically, emigration could be a gamechanger too, but it hasn’t been in the past and, as DeMogge demonstrates, currently shows no signs of becoming one). And DeMogge is likely too quick to dismiss the possibility of another mass aliyah, a point I’ll return to later.

But even if I am right about that, DeMogge is correct to argue that mass aliyah is primarily driven by factors in the country of origin. While Israel can take steps to make aliyah easier, like removing hurdles to recognition of professional credentials earned overseas, their impact is marginal compared to developments in potential immigrants’ home countries. Consequently, it makes sense to focus on an area where Israel’s policies could have a bigger impact—its own fertility rate.

That might sound equally futile, given that countries worldwide, especially Western ones, have been trying to increase birthrates for years with little success. But there’s reason to think Israel would be different—the fact that Israelis, unlike residents of other Western countries, still overwhelmingly view having children as a positive good. That’s precisely why Israel is the only Western country with a total fertility rate (TFR) above replacement level; in 2024, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, it was 2.87 overall and 3.07 for Jews (for Muslims, it was 2.74). That’s also why the statistics show that Israelis born in Israel have significantly higher TFRs than Israelis born abroad: those born in Israel grew up in a culture where having children was viewed as a good; those born abroad grew up in cultures where that is less true.